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Private Computation with Individual and Joint Privacy
Anoosheh Heidarzadeh and Alex Sprintson
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of single-server Private Computation (PC) in the presence of Side Information
(SI). In this problem, there is a server that stores K i.i.d. messages, and a user who has a subset of M uncoded
messages or a coded linear combination of them as side information, where the identities of these messages are
unknown to the server. The user wants to privately compute (via downloading information from the server) a linear
combination of a subset of D other messages, where the identities of these messages must be kept private individually
or jointly. For each setting, we define the capacity as the supremum of all achievable download rates.
We characterize the capacity of both PC with coded and uncoded SI when individual privacy is required, for all
K,M,D. Our results indicate that both settings have the same capacity. In addition, we establish a non-trivial lower
bound on the capacity of PC with coded SI when joint privacy is required, for a range of parameters K,M,D. This
lower bound is the same as the lower bound we previously established on the capacity of PC with uncoded SI when
joint privacy is required.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we consider the problem of Private Computation (PC) in the presence of side information. In this
problem, there is a single (or multiple) remote server(s) storing (identical copies of) a database of i.i.d. messages;
and there is a user who initially has a side information about some subset of messages in the database, where
the identities of the messages in the support of the side information are initially unknown to the server. The user
is interested in privately computing (via downloading information from the server(s)) a linear combination of a
different subset of database messages, while minimizing the total amount of information being downloaded from
the server(s).
We consider two different types of side information: (i) uncoded side information - where the user knows a
subset of database messages, and (ii) coded side information - where the user holds a linear combination of a
subset of database messages. These settings are referred to as PC with Side Information (PC-SI) and PC with
Coded Side Information (PC-CSI), respectively. We also consider two different privacy conditions: (i) individual
privacy - where the identity of each message in the support set of the demanded linear combination needs to be
kept private individually, and (ii) joint privacy - where the identities of all messages in the support set of the
demanded linear combination must be kept private jointly. When the condition (i) or (ii) is required, we refer to
the PC problem as Individually-Private Computation (IPC) or Jointly-Private Computation (JPC), respectively.
The goal is to design a protocol for generating the query of the user and the corresponding answer of the server(s)
such that the entropy of the answer is minimized, while the query satisfies the privacy condition.
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Both IPC and JPC settings are related to the problem of Private Computation, introduced in [1], where the
goal is to compute a linear combination of the messages in the database, while hiding both the identities and the
coefficients of these messages. Several variants of this problem were also studied in [2]–[5]. These works consider
neither individual nor joint privacy, nor any type of side information.
The JPC-SI setting, initially introduced in [6], is closely related to the problem of Private Information Retrieval
with Side Information (PIR-SI), which was initially introduced in [7], [8] and later extended in several works,
e.g., [9]–[12]. In the PIR-SI problem, a user wishes to retrieve a subset of database messages with the help of
an uncoded side information, while achieving joint privacy. Several variants of PIR with different types of side
information or different types of privacy conditions were also studied in [13]–[20]. The IPC-SI setting is an extension
of the PIR-SI problem when individual privacy is required. This problem, known as IPIR-SI, was introduced in [21].
The JPC-CSI ad IPC-CSI settings are two generalizations of PIR with Coded Side Information (PIR-CSI), previously
studied in [22] and [23].
A. Main Contributions
In this work, we focus on the single-server case. For each type of side information (coded or uncoded) and each
privacy condition (individual or joint), the capacity of the underlying setting is defined as the supremum of all
achievable download rates, where the download rate is the ratio of the entropy of a message to the entropy of the
server’s answer.
We characterize the capacity of both the IPC-SI and IPC-CSI settings, for all parameters. These results subsume
several existing results in the PIR literature. The converse proof is information-theoretic, and the achievability
scheme is a generalization of our recently proposed scheme in [24] for the PIR-CSI setting. Our results show that
the capacity of both settings are the same. This implies that, when individual privacy is required, having only one
linear combination of a subset of messages as side information is as efficient as having them all separately. In
addition, we establish a non-trivial lower bound on the capacity of the JPC-CSI setting for a range of parameters.
Interestingly, this lower bound is the same as the lower bound we previously established in [6] on the capacity of
the JPC-SI setting. The proof of achievability is based on a modification of the scheme we proposed in [6] for the
JPC-SI setting.
Our results for both IPC and JPC settings, when compared to the existing results in the PIR literature, indicate
that one can privately compute a linear combination of multiple messages much more efficiently than privately
retrieving multiple messages, and linearly combining them locally. In addition, comparing our results with those
in [1], one can see that hiding only the identities of the messages (either individually or jointly) and not their
coefficients —which may still provide a satisfactory level of privacy in many applications, can be done much less
costly, even when there is only one server and/or the user has no side information.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout, random variables and their realizations are denoted by bold-face letters and regular letters, respec-
tively.
Let Fq be a finite field for a prime q, and let Fqℓ be an extension field of Fq for a positive integer ℓ.
Let K , M , and D be non-negative integers such that K ≥M +D. Let K , {1, . . . ,K}, and let KM (or KD)
be the set of all M -subsets (or D-subsets) of K. Let C be the set of all nonzero elements in Fq , and let CM (or
CD) be the set of all ordered multisets of C of size M (or D).
Consider a single server that stores a dataset of K messages, XK , {X1, . . . , XK}, where each message Xi
is independently and uniformly distributed over Fqℓ . That is, H(Xi) = L for i ∈ K, and H(XK) = KL, where
XK , {X1, . . . ,XK}, and L , ℓ log2 q. Consider a user that knows a linear combination Y
[S,U ] ,
∑
i∈S uiXi
of M messages XS , {Xi}i∈S for some S ∈ KM and some U , {ui}i∈S ∈ CM , and wishes to retrieve a linear
combination Z [W,V ] ,
∑
i∈W viXi from the server for someW ∈ KD, W ∩S = ∅, and some V , {vi}i∈W ∈ CD.
We refer to Y [S,U ] as the side information, XS as the side information support set, S as the side information
support index set, M as the side information support size, Z [W,V ] as the demand, XW as the demand support set,
W as the demand support index set, and D as the demand support size.
We assume that S, U, and V are distributed uniformly over KM , CM , and CD, respectively, and W, given S = S,
is uniformly distributed over all W ∈ KD , W ∩ S = ∅. Also, we assume that the server initially knows M,D, and
the joint distribution of S, U, W, and V, whereas the realizations S, U , W and V are not initially known to the
server.
For any given S,U,W, V , the user sends to the server a query Q[W,V,S,U ], which is a (potentially stochastic)
function of W , V , S, and U , in order to retrieve Z [W,V ]. For simplifying the notation, we denote Q[W,V,S,U] by
Q. The query must satisfy one of the following two privacy conditions:
(i) Individual Privacy: every message in XK must be equally likely to be in the user’s demand support set, i.e.,
for all i ∈ K, it must hold that
Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q[W,V,S,U ]) = Pr(i ∈ W).
(ii) Joint Privacy: every D-subset of messages in XK must be equally likely to be the user’s demand support set,
i.e., for all W ∗ ∈ KD, it must hold that
Pr(W = W ∗|Q = Q[W,V,S,U ]) = Pr(W = W ∗).
The joint privacy, which is a stronger notion of privacy, implies the individual privacy, but not vice versa. The
main difference between these two conditions is that for joint privacy the query must protect the correlation between
the indices in the demand support index set, whereas for individual privacy some information about this correlation
may be leaked, and hence a weaker notion of privacy.
Neither individual nor joint privacy requires the privacy of the coefficients in the demand to be protected. This is
in contrast to the privacy condition being considered in [1], and as a result of this relaxation one can expect more
efficient private computation schemes in our settings. In particular, for single-server private computation without
any side information, the user must download the entire dataset in order to protect the privacy of both the identities
of the messages in the demand support set and their coefficients in the demand [1]. However, for neither of the
two privacy conditions being considered here the entire dataset needs to be downloaded, even when the user has
no side information.
Upon receiving Q[W,V,S,U ], the server sends to the user an answer A[W,V,S,U ], which is a (deterministic) function
of the query Q[W,V,S,U ] and the messages in XK. We denote A
[W,V,S,U] by A for the ease of notation. Note that
H(A|Q,XK) = 0, since (W,V,S,U) and A are conditionally independent given (Q,XK).
The collection of A[W,V,S,U ], Q[W,V,S,U ], Y [S,U ], W , V , S, and U must enable the user to retrieve the demand
Z [W,V ]. That is, it must hold that
H(Z[W,V]|A,Q,Y[S,U],W,V,S,U) = 0.
We refer to this condition as the recoverability condition.
For each type of privacy, the problem is to design a protocol for generating a query Q[W,V,S,U ] (and the
corresponding answer A[W,V,S,U ], givenQ[W,V,S,U ] andXK) for any givenW,V, S, U , such that both the privacy and
recoverability conditions are satisfied. We refer to this problem as single-server Individually-Private Computation
with Coded Side Information (IPC-CSI) or Jointly-Private Computation with Coded Side Information (JPC-CSI),
when individual or joint privacy is required, respectively.
We similarly define the IPC-SI and JPC-SI problems for the settings in which the user’s side information is the
support set XS itself, instead of a linear combination of the messages in XS .
We refer to a protocol that generates query/answer for the IPC-CSI or JPC-CSI setting as an IPC-CSI or a
JPC-CSI protocol, respectively. The rate of an IPC-CSI or a JPC-CSI protocol is defined as the ratio of the entropy
of a message, i.e., L, to the entropy of the answer A. The capacity of the IPC-CSI or JPC-CSI setting is defined
as the supremum of rates over all IPC-CSI or JPC-CSI protocols, respectively. An IPC-SI or a JPC-SI protocol, its
rate, and the capacity of the IPC-SI or JPC-SI setting are defined similarly.
Our goal in this work is to establish lower and/or upper bounds on the capacity of IPC-CSI, JPC-CSI, IPC-SI,
and JPC-SI settings, in terms of the parameters K , M , and D.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main results for the IPC and JPC settings with both coded and uncoded side information are summarized
in Sections III-A and III-B, respectively.
The following two lemmas provide a necessary condition for individual and joint privacy, for both types of side
information. The proofs are straightforward by the way of contradiction, and hence omitted for brevity.
Lemma 1 (A Necessary Condition for Individual Privacy). For any i ∈ K, there exist W ∗ ∈ KD , V
∗ ∈ CD, and
S∗ ∈ KM where i ∈W ∗ and S∗ ∩W ∗ = ∅, such that
H(Z[W
∗,V ∗]|A,Q,XS∗) = 0.
Lemma 2 (A Necessary Condition for Joint Privacy). For any W ∗ ∈ KD, there exist V ∗ ∈ CD and S∗ ∈ KM
where S∗ ∩W ∗ = ∅, such that
H(Z[W
∗,V ∗]|A,Q,XS∗) = 0.
Thinking of scalar-linear IPC or JPC protocols —where the answer consists only of scalar-linear combinations
of the messages in XK, the necessary conditions in Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the need for linear codes that satisfy
certain combinatorial requirements. (Recently, in [12], we made a similar connection between single-server PIR with
side information and locally recoverable codes.) Consider a (linear) code of length K that satisfies the following
requirement: for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, there is a codeword of (Hamming) weight D or M +D (or at least D and at
most M +D) whose support includes the index i. The parity-check equations of the dual of any such code can be
used for constructing a scalar-linear IPC-CSI (or IPC-SI) protocol. Minimizing the entropy of the answer in order
to maximize the rate of the protocol translates into minimizing the dimension of the code. In this work, we design
optimal codes with minimum dimension for all K,M,D for the IPC-CSI setting. These codes naturally serve also
as optimal codes for the IPC-SI setting.
The problem of designing a scalar-linear JPC-CSI (or JPC-SI) protocol reduces to the problem of designing a code
of length K with minimum dimension satisfying the following requirement: for any D-subset W ⊆ {1, . . . ,K},
there is a codeword of weight D or M+D (or at least D and at mostM+D) whose support includes the D-subset
W . The design of optimal codes satisfying this requirement remains an open problem. In [6], we initiated the study
of the JPC-SI setting, and established a non-trivial upper bound on the dimension of optimal codes for this setting.
In this work, we make the first attempt towards characterizing the dimension of optimal codes for the JPC-CSI
setting; and provide a non-trivial upper bound for a range of parameters K,M,D.
A. IPC-SI and IPC-CSI
The capacity of IPC-SI and IPC-CSI for arbitrary K,M,D are characterized in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively.
Theorem 1. For the IPC-SI setting with K messages, side information of size M , and demand support size D, the
capacity is given by ⌈ KM+D ⌉
−1
.
Theorem 2. For the IPC-CSI setting with K messages, side information support size M , and demand support size
D, the capacity is given by ⌈ KM+D ⌉
−1
.
For the converse proof, we use information-theoretic arguments relying primarily on the result of Lemma 1, to
upper bound the rate of any IPC-SI protocol (see Section IV-A). This upper bound obviously holds for any IPC-CSI
protocol. For the proof of achievability, we construct a new scalar-linear IPC-CSI protocol, termed the Generalized
Modified Partition-and-Code (GMPC) protocol, which achieves the rate upper bound (see Section IV-B). This
protocol naturally serves also as an IPC-SI protocol. The GMPC protocol is based on the idea of non-uniform
randomized partitioning, and generalizes our recently proposed protocol in [24] for the PIR-CSI setting. Examples
of the GMPC protocol are given in Section V.
Remark 1. The matching capacity of the IPC-SI and IPC-CSI settings shows that achieving individual privacy
comes at no loss in capacity if the user has only one random linear combination of M random messages, instead
of M random messages separately as their side information.
Remark 2. As shown in [21], for the IPIR-SI setting, the normalized download cost of K−M⌊ KM+D ⌋ or D⌈
K
M+D ⌉
(depending on K,M,D) is achievable, where the normalized download cost is defined as the download cost
normalized by the entropy of a message. Comparing this with the result of Theorem 1, one can see that, when
individual privacy is required, one can privately compute a linear combination of multiple messages much more
efficiently than retrieving them privately and linearly combining them locally.
Remark 3. For the case ofM = 0, the capacity of both IPC-SI and IPC-CSI settings is equal to ⌈KD ⌉
−1. Depending
on the value of D, the capacity can be substantially larger than 1K , which was shown to be the capacity of single-
server private computation where the privacy of both the demand support index set and the coefficients in the demand
must be preserved [1]. For the case of D = 1, both the IPC-SI and IPC-CSI problems reduce to the problems of
PIR-SI [7] and PIR-CSI where the demanded message does not lie in the support of the side information [22],
respectively. The capacity of these settings were shown to be equal to ⌈ KM+1⌉
−1, matching the results of Theorems 1
and 2.
B. JPC-SI and JPC-CSI
Theorem 3 lower bounds the capacity of JPC-SI for all K,M,D, and Theorem 4 establishes a lower bound on
the capacity of JPC-CSI for some values of K,M,D.
Theorem 3 ( [6]). For the JPC-SI setting with K messages, side information of size M , and demand support size
D, the capacity is lower bounded by (⌈K−M−D⌊M/D⌋+1⌉+ 1)
−1.
Theorem 4. For the JPC-CSI setting with K messages, side information support size M , and demand support size
D, the capacity is lower bounded by (K−M−D⌊M/D⌋+1 + 1)
−1 if ⌊MD ⌋+ 1 divides K −M −D.
The capacity lower bound in Theorem 3 is achievable by a scalar-linear JPC-SI protocol, called Partition-and-
Code with Interference Alignment (PC-IA), which we recently proposed in [6]. The PC-IA protocol is applicable for
all K,M,D, and relies on the idea of a probabilistic partitioning that allows the parts to overlap and have multiple
blocks of interference that are aligned (for details, see [6]).
Theorem 4, which appears without proof, follows directly from a simple observation that the PC-IA protocol
(with a slight modification in the choice of coefficients in the linear combinations that constitute the server’s answer
to the user’s query) serves also as a scalar-linear JPC-CSI protocol for some values of K,M,D, particularly when
the divisibility condition in the theorem’s statement holds; however, the PC-IA protocol is not a JPC-CSI protocol
in general. Examples of the PC-IA protocol for both cases are given in Section V.
We have been able to design different scalar-linear JPC-CSI protocols for some other values of K,M,D; but
the constructions are not universal and are limited to specific values of K,M,D, and hence not presented in this
work. The extension of these constructions to arbitrary K,M,D is a challenging open problem, and the focus of
an ongoing work.
Remark 4. As was shown in [6], when joint privacy is required, with the help of an uncoded side information
the download cost for the private computation of one linear combination of multiple messages can be much lower
than that of privately retrieving multiple messages and computing the linear combination of them. For instance, for
K even, when the user has M = 2 messages as side information, for privately computing a linear combination of
D = 2 messages the normalized download cost is equal to K2 − 1 (see Theorem 3); whereas, privately retrieving
D = 2 messages incurs a normalized download cost of min{K − 2,K − ⌊K3 ⌋}, which is significantly higher than
K
2 − 1 (see [9, Theorem 2]). Surprisingly, the result of Theorem 4 shows that for some values of K,M,D (e.g.,
K even and M = D = 2), only one linear combination of M messages suffices to achieve the same normalized
download cost (e.g., K2 − 1). This is interesting because regardless of the values of M and D, when joint privacy is
required, with the help of only one linear combination of M messages the normalized download cost for retrieving
D messages is equal to K − 1, which is much higher than, for instance, K2 − 1.
Remark 5. The capacity lower bounds in Theorems 3 and 4 are tight for the cases of D = 1 and M = 0 (see [7],
[22]). We have been able to prove the tightness of these bounds for small values of K,M,D, particularly for
M = D = 2 and several values of K . Nevertheless, it remains open whether these lower bounds are tight for all
K,M,D in general.
Remark 6. The matching capacity lower bounds in Theorems 3 and 4 raises an intriguing question whether, similar
to the IPC-SI and IPC-CSI settings, the capacity of the JPC-SI and JPC-CSI settings are the same. We conjecture
that the answer is affirmative for both linear and non-linear protocols.
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
Since any IPC-CSI protocol is an IPC-SI protocol, for the converse we only need to upper bound the rate of any
IPC-SI protocol, whereas for the achievability it suffices to design an IPC-CSI protocol that achieves the rate upper
bound.
A. Converse
Lemma 3. The rate of any IPC-SI protocol for K messages, side information of size M , and demand support size
D, is upper bounded by ⌈ KM+D ⌉
−1
.
Proof: To prove the lemma, we need to show that H(A) ≥ ⌈ KM+D ⌉L. Take arbitrary W ∈ KD, V ∈ CD,
S ∈ KM such that S ∩W = ∅. By a simple application of the chain rule of entropy, one can show that
H(A) ≥ H(Z) +H(A|Q,XS ,Z), (1)
where Z , Z[W,V ]. Note that H(Z) = L. We consider two cases: (i) W ∪ S = K, and (ii) W ∪ S 6= K. In the
case (i), we have M = K −D, and ⌈ KM+D ⌉L = L; and hence, (1) implies that H(A) ≥ H(Z) = L, as was to be
shown.
In the case (ii), we further lower bound H(A|Q,XS ,Z) as follows. Choose an arbitrary message, say Xi1 ,
for some i1 6∈ W ∪ S. By the result of Lemma 1, there exist W1 ∈ KD , i1 ∈ W1, V1 ∈ CD, and S1 ∈ KM ,
S1 ∩W1 = ∅, such that H(Z1|A,Q,XS1) = 0, or in turn, H(Z1|A,Q,XS ,Z,Z1) = 0, where Z1 , Z
[W1,V1].
Thus,
H(A|Q,XS ,Z) ≥ H(A|Q,XS ,Z,XS1)
+H(Z1|A,Q,XS ,Z,XS1)
= H(Z1|Q,XS ,Z,XS1)
+H(A|Q,XS ,Z,XS1 ,Z1)
= H(Z1)
+H(A|Q,XS ,Z,XS1 ,Z1) (2)
where Z1 and (Q,XS ,Z,XS1) are independent because i1 ∈ W1 and i1 6∈W ∪ S ∪ S1. Let n , ⌈
K
M+D ⌉. Using
Lemma 1 recursively, it can be shown that for all 1 ≤ k < n there exist i1, . . . , ik ∈ K, W1, . . . ,Wk ∈ KD,
V1, . . . , Vk ∈ CD, and S1, . . . , Sk ∈ KM satisfying il ∈ Wl, Sl ∩Wl = ∅, il 6∈ ∪
l−1
j=1(Wj ∪ Sj) ∪ (W ∪ S) for all
1 ≤ l ≤ k, such that
H(Zk|A,Q,XS ,Z,XS1 ,Z1, . . . ,XSk−1 ,Zk−1,XSk) = 0,
where Zl , Z
[Wl,Vl] for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Obviously,
∣∣∪k−1j=1 (Wj ∪ Sj) ∪ (W ∪ S)∣∣ ≤ (M +D)k for all 1 ≤ k < n.
Applying the same technique as in (2), it can then be shown that for all 1 ≤ k < n, we have
H(A|Q,XS ,Z,XS1 ,Z1, . . . ,XSk−1 ,Zk−1)
≥ H(Zk) +H(A|Q,XS ,Z,XS1 ,Z1, . . . ,XSk ,Zk).
Putting together these lower bounds for all k, we have
H(A|Q,XS ,Z) ≥
n−1∑
k=1
H(Zk) = (n− 1)L, (3)
since Z1, . . . ,Zn−1 are independent by the choice of i1, . . . , in−1 in the construction. Combining (1) and (3), we
have H(A) ≥ nL = ⌈ KM+D ⌉L, as was to be shown.
B. Achievability
For the ease of notation, we define n , ⌈ KM+D ⌉, m , n(M +D)−K, and r ,M +D −m.
Generalized Modified Partition-and-Code (GMPC) Protocol: This protocol consists of three steps as follows:
Step 1: Let Il , {(l − 1)(M +D) + 1, . . . , l(M +D)} for 1 ≤ l < n, and let In , {1, . . . ,m, (n − 1)(M +
D) + 1, . . . ,K}. Note that I1 ∩ In = {1, . . . ,m}.
First, the user constructs a random permutation π on K as follows. With probability α , m+2rK , the user chooses
l∗ ∈ {1, n} uniformly at random; otherwise, with probability 1−α, the user randomly chooses l∗ ∈ {2, . . . , n−1}.
If l∗ ∈ {1, n}, with probability β (or 1 − β) where the choice of β will be specified shortly, the user assigns
µ , min{D,m} (or D − ρ , D − min{D, r}) randomly chosen indices from W and m − µ (or m − D + ρ)
randomly chosen indices from S to {π(j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} at random, and randomly assigns the rest of the indices in
W ∪ S to {π(j) : j ∈ Il∗ \ {1, . . . ,m}}. Otherwise, if l∗ ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, the user randomly assigns the M +D
indices in W ∪ S to {π(j) : j ∈ Il∗}. Then, the user assigns the (not-yet-assigned) indices in K \ (W ∪ S) to
{π(j) : j 6∈ Il∗}.
The value of β, which is carefully chosen in order to satisfy the individual privacy condition, depends on the
values of D,m, r:
β ,


m
m+2r , D ≤ m,D ≤ r,
D
m+2r , D > m,D ≤ r,
1− 2Dm+2r , D ≤ m,D > r,
r
M
(
1− 2Dm+2r
)
, D > m,D > r.
Next, the user constructs n ordered sets Q′1, . . . , Q
′
n, each of size M +D, defined as Q
′
k , {π(j) : j ∈ Il}; and
constructs an ordered multiset Q′′ of size M +D, defined as Q′′ , {cj : j ∈ Il∗} where cj = vpi(j) or cj = upi(j)
when π(j) ∈W or π(j) ∈ S, respectively. Recall that vpi(j) or upi(j) is the coefficient of the message Xpi(j) in the
user’s demand or side information, respectively.
The user then constructs Ql = (Q
′
l, Q
′′) for 1 ≤ l ≤ n, and sends the query Q[W,V,S,U ] = {Q1, . . . , Qn} to the
server.
Step 2: By using Ql = (Q
′
l, Q
′′)’s, the server computes Al’s, defined as Al ,
∑M+D
j=1 cijXij where Q
′
l =
{i1, . . . , iM+D} and Q′′ = {ci1 , . . . , ciM+D}, and sends the answer A
[W,V,S,U ] = {A1, . . . , An} back to the user.
Step 3: Upon receiving the server’s answer, the user retrieves the demand Z [W,V ] by subtracting off the contribution
of the side information Y [S,U ] from Al∗ = Z
[W,V ] + Y [S,U ].
Lemma 4. The GMPC protocol is a scalar-linear IPC-CSI protocol, and achieves the rate ⌈ KM+D ⌉
−1
.
Proof: The rate and the scalar-linearity of the GMPC protocol are obvious from the construction. Clearly, the
recoverability condition is also satisfied.
To prove that the GMPC protocol satisfies the individual privacy condition, we need to show that for any given
query Q generated by the protocol, for all i ∈ K, it holds that
Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q) = Pr(i ∈ W) =
D
K
,
noting that W is distributed uniformly over KD .
Fix an arbitrary i ∈ K. We consider the following three different cases separately: (i) π−1(i) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; (ii)
π−1(i) ∈ Il \ {1, . . . ,m} for some l ∈ {1, n}; and (iii) π−1(i) ∈ Il for some l 6∈ {1, n}, where π−1(i) = j if and
only if π(j) = i.
First, consider the case (i). In this case, we have
Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q)
=
∑
l∈{1,n}
Pr(i ∈ W, l∗ = l|Q = Q)
=
∑
l∈{1,n}
Pr(l∗ = l|Q = Q)× Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q, l∗ = l)
= 2
(
1
2
× α
(
β ×
(
m−1
µ−1
)
(
m
µ
) + (1− β)×
(
m−1
D−ρ−1
)
(
m
D−ρ
)
))
=


αβ
(
D
m
)
, D ≤ m,D ≤ r,
αβ, D > m,D ≤ r,
α
(
β
(
D
m
)
+ (1− β)
(
D−r
m
))
, D ≤ m,D > r,
α
(
β + (1 − β)
(
D−r
m
)
)
)
, D > m,D > r,
=
D
K
,
for our choice of β for each range of values of D,m, r.
Next, consider the case (ii). In this case, we have
Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q)
= Pr(i ∈ W, l∗ = l|Q = Q)
= Pr(l∗ = l|Q = Q)× Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q, l∗ = l)
=
1
2
× α
(
β ×
(
r−1
D−µ−1
)
(
r
D−µ
) + (1− β)×
(
r−1
ρ−1
)
(
r
ρ
)
)
=


α
2 (1 − β)
(
D
r
)
, D ≤ m,D ≤ r,
α
2
(
β
(
D−m
r
)
+ (1− β)
(
D
r
))
, D > m,D ≤ r,
α
2 (1 − β), D ≤ m,D > r,
α
2
(
β
(
D−m
r
)
+ (1− β)
)
, D > m,D > r,
=
D
K
,
for the choices of β specified earlier.
Lastly, consider the case (iii). In this case, we have
Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q)
= Pr(i ∈ W, l∗ = l|Q = Q)
= Pr(l∗ = l|Q = Q) Pr(i ∈ W|Q = Q, l∗ = l)
=
1
n− 2
× (1 − α)
(
D
M +D
)
=
(
M +D
K −m− 2r
)(
K −m− 2r
K
)(
D
M +D
)
=
D
K
.
This completes the proof.
V. EXAMPLES
A. GMPC Protocol
This section illustrates two examples of the GMPC protocol for M = D = 2 and K ∈ {11, 12}.
Example 1. Consider a scenario where the server has K = 12 messages X1, . . . , X12 ∈ F7, and the user demands
the linear combination Z = X1+3X2 with support sizeD = 2 and has a coded side information Y = 5X3+X4 with
support sizeM = 2. For this example,W = {1, 2}, V = {v1, v2} = {1, 3}, S = {3, 4}, and U = {u3, u4} = {5, 1}.
For this example, the protocol’s parameters are as follows: n = 3, m = 0, r = 4, α = 23 , β =
1
4 , µ = 0 and
ρ = 2.
Let I1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, I2 = {5, 6, 7, 8}, and I3 = {9, 10, 11, 12}. First, the user constructs a permutation π
of {1, . . . , 12} as follows. With probability α = 23 , the user randomly chooses l
∗ ∈ {1, 3}, or with probability
1 − α = 13 , the user chooses l
∗ = 2. Note that for this example, l∗ is equally likely to be any of the indices in
{1, 2, 3}. Suppose that the user chooses l∗ = 1. Since, for this example, µ = 0, D − ρ = 0, m − µ = 0, and
m−D + ρ = 0, the user randomly assigns all indices in W ∪ S = {1, 2, 3, 4} to {π(j) : j ∈ I1}; say, π(1) = 2,
π(2) = 4, π(3) = 1, and π(4) = 3. Then, the user randomly assigns the (not-yet-assigned) indices in {5, . . . , 12}
to {π(j) : j 6∈ I1}; say, π(5) = 10, π(6) = 8, π(7) = 6, π(8) = 5, π(9) = 11, π(10) = 9, π(11) = 12, and
π(12) = 7. Thus, the permutation π maps {1, . . . , 12} to {2, 4, 1, 3, 10, 8, 6, 5, 11, 9, 12, 7}.
Next, the user constructs the ordered sets Q′1 = {π(j) : j ∈ I1} = {2, 4, 1, 3}, Q
′
2 = {π(j) : j ∈ I2} =
{10, 8, 6, 5}, and Q′3 = {π(j) : j ∈ I3} = {11, 9, 12, 7}; and constructs the ordered multiset Q
′′ = {cj : j ∈ I1} =
{c1, c2, c3, c4} = {v2, u4, v1, u3} = {3, 1, 1, 5}. The user then constructsQ1 = (Q′1, Q
′′) = ({2, 4, 1, 3}, {3, 1, 1, 5}),
Q2 = (Q
′
2, Q
′′) = ({10, 8, 6, 5}, {3, 1, 1, 5}), and Q3 = (Q′3, Q
′′) = ({11, 9, 12, 7}, {3, 1, 1, 5}); and sends the
query Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3} to the server.
The server computesA1 = 3X2+X4+X1+5X3, A2 = 3X10+X8+X6+5X5, and A3 = 3X11+X9+X12+5X7;
and sends the answer A = {A1, A2, A3} back to the user. The user then subtracts Y = 5X3 + X4 from Al∗ =
A1 = 3X2 +X4 +X1 + 5X3, and recovers Z = X1 + 3X2.
To prove that the individual privacy condition is satisfied in this example, we need to show that the probability
of every message Xi to be one of the two messages in XW is
2
12 =
1
6 . From the perspective of the server, l
∗ is 1,
2, or 3, each with probability 13 . Given l
∗ = l, every one of the 6 pairs of messages in the support of Al are the
two messages in XW with probability
1
6 . Since every message in the support of Al belongs to 3 pairs of messages,
the probability of any message in the support of Al to be one of the two messages in XW is 3×
1
6 =
1
2 . Thus, the
probability of any message Xi to belong to XW is
1
3 ×
1
2 =
1
6 .
Example 2. Consider the scenario in Example 1 (i.e., W = {1, 2}, V = {1, 3}, S = {3, 4}, and U = {5, 1}),
except when the server has K = 11 messages X1, . . . , X11 ∈ F7.
The protocol’s parameters for this example are as follows: n = 3, m = 1, r = 3, α = 711 , β =
2
7 , µ = 1 and
ρ = 2.
Let I1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, I2 = {5, 6, 7, 8}, and I3 = {1, 9, 10, 11}. The user first constructs a permutation π of
{1, . . . , 11} as follows. With probability α = 711 , the user randomly chooses l
∗ ∈ {1, 3}, or with probability
1 − α = 411 , the user chooses l
∗ = 2. For this example, l∗ is equal to 1, 2, or 3, with probability 722 ,
4
11 , or
7
22 , respectively. Suppose that the user chooses l
∗ = 1. With probability β = 27 (or 1 − β =
5
7 ), the user assigns
µ = 1 randomly chosen index from W = {1, 2} (or m −D + ρ = 1 randomly chosen index from S = {3, 4}),
say the index 2, to π(1), i.e., π(1) = 2; and randomly assigns the rest of the indices in W ∪ S = {1, 2, 3, 4},
i.e., {1, 3, 4}, to {π(j) : j ∈ I1 \ {1}}; say π(2) = 4, π(3) = 1, and π(4) = 3. Then, the user randomly assigns
the (not-yet-assigned) indices in {5, . . . , 11} to {π(j) : j 6∈ I1}; say, π(5) = 10, π(6) = 8, π(7) = 6, π(8) = 5,
π(9) = 11, π(10) = 9, and π(11) = 7. Thus, the permutation π maps {1, . . . , 11} to {2, 4, 1, 3, 10, 8, 6, 5, 11, 9, 7}.
Next, the user constructs the ordered sets Q′1 = {π(j) : j ∈ I1} = {2, 4, 1, 3}, Q
′
2 = {π(j) : j ∈ I2} =
{10, 8, 6, 5}, and Q′3 = {π(j) : j ∈ I3} = {2, 11, 9, 7}; and constructs the ordered multiset Q
′′ = {cj : j ∈ I1} =
{c1, c2, c3, c4} = {v2, u4, v1, u3} = {3, 1, 1, 5}. The user then constructsQ1 = (Q′1, Q
′′) = ({2, 4, 1, 3}, {3, 1, 1, 5}),
Q2 = (Q
′
2, Q
′′) = ({10, 8, 6, 5}, {3, 1, 1, 5}), and Q3 = (Q′3, Q
′′) = ({2, 11, 9, 7}, {3, 1, 1, 5}); and sends the query
Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3} to the server.
The server computes A1 = 3X2+X4+X1+5X3, A2 = 3X10+X8+X6+5X5, and A3 = 3X2+X11+X9+5X7;
and sends the answer A = {A1, A2, A3} back to the user. The user then subtracts Y = 5X3 + X4 from Al∗ =
A1 = 3X2 +X4 +X1 + 5X3, and recovers Z = X1 + 3X2.
Now, we show that the individual privacy condition is satisfied for this example. We need to verify that every
message Xi belongs to XW with probability
2
11 . From the server’s perspective, l
∗ is 1, 2, or 3 with probability 722 ,
4
11 , or
7
22 , respectively. First, consider the message X2. Given l
∗ = 1 (or l∗ = 3), the message X2, which belongs
to the support of both A1 and A3, is one of the two messages in XW with probability
2
7 ; whereas for l
∗ = 2, the
message X2 cannot belong to XW . Thus, the probability of the message X2 to belong to XW is 2×
7
22 ×
2
7 =
2
11 .
Now, consider the message X1. Given l
∗ = 1, the message X1 belongs to XW with probability
2
7 ×
1
3 +
5
7 ×
2
3 =
4
7 .
This is because for X1 being one of the two messages in XW given l
∗ = 1, either (i) X2 belongs to XW , which has
probability 27 , and X1 is the other message in XW , which has probability
1
3 (given X2 belonging to XW ), or (ii)
X2 does not belong to XW , which has probability
5
7 , and one of the pairs X1, X3 or X1, X4 are the two messages
in XW , which has probability
2
3 (given X2 not belonging to XW ). Given l
∗ = 2 or l∗ = 3, the message X1 cannot
be one of the two messages in XW . Thus, the probability of the message X1 to belong to XW is
7
22 ×
4
7 =
2
11 .
Similarly, one can show that any message Xi belongs to XW with probability
2
11 .
B. PC-IA Protocol
In this section, we give two examples for the PC-IA protocol for M = D = 2 and K ∈ {11, 12}. Example 3
shows an instance where the PC-IA is a JPC-CSI protocol, whereas Example 4 shows an instance for which the
PC-IA fails as a JPC-CSI protocol.
Example 3. Consider the scenario in Example 1, except when joint privacy is required, instead of individual privacy.
The protocol’s parameters for this example are as follows (for details, see [6]): s = 2, n = 5, m = 6, r = 0, and
t = 1, and {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, y0, y1} = {0, 1, . . . , 6}.
First, the user creates m = 6 ordered sets B1, . . . , B6, where Bj = {−,−} for all j, i.e., Bj has two slots to be
filled with elements from {1, . . . , 12}. The user then randomly places the D = 2 indices in W = {1, 2} into two
slots; say, B2 = {2,−}, B3 = {−, 1}, and B1, B4, B5, B6 remain empty. Since B2 and B3 contain some indices
from W , the user fills B2 and B3, each with a randomly chosen index from S = {3, 4}; say, B2 = {2, 4}, and
B3 = {3, 1}. Next, the user randomly places the remaining indices 5, . . . , 12 into the remaining slots, and fills
B1, B4, B5, B6; say B1 = {11, 6}, B4 = {10, 12}, B5 = {8, 9}, and B6 = {7, 5}.
The user then constructs n = 5 ordered sets Q1, . . . , Q5, where Qi = {B1, B1+i}. That is, Q1 = {11, 6, 2, 4},
Q2 = {11, 6, 3, 1}, Q3 = {11, 6, 10, 12}, Q4 = {11, 6, 8, 9}, and Q5 = {11, 6, 7, 5}. Next, the user creates
n = 5 ordered multisets Q′1, . . . , Q
′
5, defined as Q
′
i = {Ci,1, Ci,1+i}, where Ci,1 = {α1,1ωi,1, α1,2ωi,1} and
Ci,1+i = {α1+i,1, α1+i,2}, where ωi,j = 1/(xi − yj); and the values of αj,k’s are specified shortly. For this example,
the user constructs Q′1 = {2, 5, 3, 1}, Q
′
2 = {1, 6, 1, 3}, Q
′
3 = {3, 1, 3, 3}, Q
′
4 = {4, 3, 4, 1}, and Q
′
5 = {6, 1, 3, 2}.
The procedure for choosing αj,k’s is described below. First, the user finds: (i) the set J of indices j such that Bj
contains some indices fromW ; (ii) the minimal set I (with highest lexicographical order) of indices of Qi’s such that
∪i∈IQi contains all indices in W ; and (iii) the set H of |I|−1 = 1 largest indices in {1, . . . , t}\J ; for this example,
J = {2, 3}, I = {1, 2}, and H = {1}. Then, the user forms the matrix T = (ωi,j)i∈I,j∈H = [ω1,1, ω2,1]T = [1, 4]T,
and chooses c1 = 1 and c2 = −ω1,1/ω2,1 = 5 such that [c1, c2] · T = 0. The user then selects αj,k’s as follows:
for j ∈ J = {2, 3} and k ∈ {1, . . . , s} = {1, 2} such that the kth element of Bj , say, l, belongs to W (or S), the
user selects αj,k = vl/
∑
i∈I ciωi,j (or αj,k = ul/
∑
i∈I ciωi,j) if 1 ≤ j ≤ t = 1, and selects α1+i,k = vl/ci (or
α1+i,k = ul/ci), where vl (or ul) is the coefficient of the message Xl in the user’s demand Z (or side information
Y ). For this example, α2,1 = v2/c1 = 3 and α2,2 = u4/c1 = 1 (the first element in B2 and the second element in
B3 are the demand support indices 2 and 1, respectively); and α3,1 = u3/c2 = 1 and α3,2 = v1/c2 = 3 (the second
element in B2 and the first element in B3 are the side information support indices 4 and 3, respectively). The user
selects the rest of αj,k’s from Fq \ {0} = {1, . . . , 6} at random; say, α1,1 = 2, α1,2 = 5, α4,1 = 3, α4,2 = 3,
α5,1 = 4, α5,2 = 1, α6,1 = 3, and α6,2 = 2. These choices of αj,k’s yield the ordered multisets Q
′
1, . . . , Q
′
5 defined
earlier.
The user then sends to the server
(Q1, Q
′
1) = ({11, 6, 2, 4}, {2, 5, 3, 1}),
(Q2, Q
′
2) = ({11, 6, 3, 1}, {1, 6, 1, 3}),
(Q3, Q
′
3) = ({11, 6, 10, 12}, {3, 1, 3, 3}),
(Q4, Q
′
4) = ({11, 6, 8, 9}, {4, 3, 4, 1}),
(Q5, Q
′
5) = ({11, 6, 7, 5}, {6, 1, 3, 2}),
and the server sends the user back
A1 = 2X11 + 5X6 + 3X2 +X4,
A2 = X11 + 6X6 +X3 + 3X1,
A3 = 3X11 +X6 + 3X10 + 3X12,
A4 = 4X11 + 3X6 + 4X8 +X9,
A5 = 6X11 +X6 + 3X7 + 2X5.
Then, the user computes c1A1 + c2A2 = A1 +5A2 = X1 +3X2 +5X3 +X4; and subtracting off the contribution
of Y = 5X3 +X4, recovers Z = X1 + 3X2.
To show that the joint privacy condition is satisfied in this example, we need to prove that any pair of messages
is equally likely to be in XW . As an example, consider the pair of messages X1 and X2. According to the supports
of A1 and A2, X1 and X2 belong to XW if and only if X3 and X4 are the two messages in XS . This is because
X1 belongs only to the support of A2, and X2 belongs only to the support of A1; and by the protocol, one of
the messages in XS (in this case, X3) must be paired with X1, and the other message in XS (in this case, X4)
must be paired with X2. Note that X6 and X11 are aligned in A1 and A2; and they can be canceled by linearly
combining A1 and A2. Moreover, there exists a unique such linear combination of A1 and A2, i.e., c1A1 + c2A2,
where the coefficient of A1, i.e., c1, is equal to 1. Note that by the protocol, the coefficient of the least-indexed Ai
in the linear combination of Ai’s being used by the user in the recovery process (in this case, the coefficient c1 of
A1 in the linear combination c1A1 + c2A2) is always chosen to be equal to 1.
Next, consider a different pair of messages, say, X2 and X6. According to the support of A1, the messages X2
and X6 belong to XW if and only if the messages X11 and X4 belong to XS . In this case, A1 is the unique linear
combination of Ai’s (with the least-indexed Ai having coefficient 1) whose support contains X2, X6, X11, X4. As
another example, consider the pair of messages X6 and X11. By the protocol, X11 and X6 belong to XW if and
only if X2 and X4 belong to XS . This is because A1 is the least-indexed Ai whose support contains X11 and X6.
Similarly as above, one can verify that from the perspective of the server, there is a unique way to recover a linear
combination of any two messages. This observation, together with the fact that by the protocol the two messages in
XW were placed randomly in the support of Ai’s, show that any pair of messages is equally likely to be in XW .
Example 4. Consider the scenario in Example 2, except when, instead of individual privacy, joint privacy is required.
Following the procedure in the PC-IA protocol, without specifying the choice of nonzero coefficients (denoted
by ‘∗’), the server’s answer to the user’s query will have one of the following structures (up to a permutation of 1
and 2; a permutation of 3 and 4; and a permutation of 5, . . . , 11):
Case (i):
A1 = ∗X5 + ∗X1 + ∗X3,
A2 = ∗X5 + ∗X2 + ∗X4,
A3 = ∗X5 + ∗X6 + ∗X7,
A4 = ∗X5 + ∗X8 + ∗X9,
A5 = ∗X5 + ∗X10 + ∗X11.
Case (ii):
A1 = ∗X3 + ∗X1 + ∗X2,
A2 = ∗X3 + ∗X4 + ∗X5,
A3 = ∗X3 + ∗X6 + ∗X7,
A4 = ∗X3 + ∗X8 + ∗X9,
A5 = ∗X3 + ∗X10 + ∗X11.
Case (iii):
A1 = ∗X1 + ∗X2 + ∗X3,
A2 = ∗X1 + ∗X4 + ∗X5,
A3 = ∗X1 + ∗X6 + ∗X7,
A4 = ∗X1 + ∗X8 + ∗X9,
A5 = ∗X1 + ∗X10 + ∗X11.
In either of these cases, one can easily verify that for any D = 2 messages, say, Xi1 and Xi2 , there exists a linear
combination of Ai’s whose support includes Xi1 and Xi2 , and has size at least D = 2 and at most M +D = 4.
(Recall that this property is required for any scalar-linear JPC-SI protocol.) For instance, consider the two messages
X1 and X2. In the case (i), by linearly combining A1 and A2 in such a way that X5 is canceled, one can recover
a linear combination of X1, X2, X3, and X4. In both cases (ii) and (iii), the support of A1 contains X1 and X2,
and has size 3 (< 4). On the other hand, for a scalar-linear JPC-CSI protocol, a stronger requirement needs to be
satisfied: for any two messages Xi1 and Xi2 , there must exist a linear combination of Ai’s whose support includes
Xi1 and Xi2 , and has size exactly equal to M +D = 4. For the two messages X1 and X2, however, neither case
(ii) nor (iii) satisfies the underlying requirement.
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